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On the Rationale of Bank Lending in Pre-Crisis Thailand
Abstract:
Evidence from credit files is provided to examine bank lending determinants of Thai 
commercial banks. Their lending practice follows reasonable patterns as a standard 
set of variables, including indirect risk variables, explains much of the variance in 
interest rate spread. Reflecting institutional differences with mature markets, we find 
higher importance of relationship banking and risk control via credit availability. In-
formation about later default reveals prudent relationship lending. However, banks 
could have made better use of available information about borrowers' riskiness. 
These findings do not support a general verdict of bad banking but indicate room to 
improve lending decisions.
JEL-Classification: G 21, O 16
Keywords: Financial system, bank lending, relationship lending, financial 
crises, emerging economies, Thailand
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On the Rationale of Bank Lending in Pre-Crisis Thailand
1 Introduction
Banks are more important in developing economies than in industrialized coun-
tries (Levine 1997). Moreover, bank-based financial systems seem to be more suc-
cessful in developing economies than in industrialized countries. These results re-
flect the general opinion that developing countries ought to be judged different in 
their institutions. Thus, we cannot expect that our insights in respect to bank lending 
in mature markets will remain when examining emerging markets. Despite this fact, 
there is hardly any micro-based empirical analysis of bank lending in developing 
countries. Indeed our case study does show that lending decisions of Thai commer-
cial banks are determined differently to those in industrialized economies. We find
that relationship lending is more enunciated than in mature markets, credit availabil-
ity is used as an instrument of risk control, and that information on default risk is not 
extracted very well from balance sheet data.
The Thai case seems to be of particular interest beyond covering an emerging 
market, because the Asian crisis of 1997/98 started in Thailand. Consequently, con-
tagion as an explanatory variable can be excluded here (see Park and Song, 2001). 
Moreover, the domestic financial sector should be analyzed as its problems pre-
ceded the overall economic crisis in Thailand (see e.g. Warr, 1999, Alba et al., 2001, 
Rajan, 2001). However, we entertain doubts to some general verdict of bad banking 
practices: before the Asian crisis, Thailand's banks were regarded as a positive ele-
ment in the economy and Thailand was among the countries classified as resource-
efficient (World Bank, 1993). The resulting comparatively high total factor productivity 
would be difficult to explain in light of a large and inefficient banking sector (Menk-
hoff, 2000).
Thus, first-hand micro-level evidence helps to improve our understanding of the 
rationale of bank lending before the crisis: were lending determinants any different 
from those in mature markets, reflecting different institutions and therefore indicating 
any degree of functionality? Was risk-taking – the main indicator of bad banking 
practices – inappropriate? Were relations between the bank and its borrowers – a 
typical motivation for bad banking – too close to allow for prudent banking?
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We conducted an in-depth case study of the lending decisions of Thai commer-
cial banks before the Asian crisis, based on their internal credit files. Thus, our study 
fits into a large new literature on the functioning of financial systems in emerging 
markets. The unexpected outbreak of the Asian crisis, and the fact that there was no 
historical precedent for the nature of its progress, initiated this wealth of new re-
search.1 It complements ongoing debates on liberalization and the growth effects of 
financial development.2 Our contribution is to explain the lending process from the 
banks' perspective, as this piece of evidence has been missing until now. We ana-
lyze Thai commercial banks under the theoretical perspective of relationship lending 
(Boot, 2000), as it is precisely these close relations between banks and their cus-
tomers that characterize lending in emerging economies. For this purpose, a new 
data set was compiled in 2000/01, consisting of 560 credit files sourced from the ma-
jority of Thai commercial banks. These banks form the core of Thailand's financial 
system, accounting for around 60% of total assets.3 The data cover the period 1992 
to 1996.
The only other similar kind of paper focusing on an emerging economy of which 
we are aware (La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa, 2003) examines related 
lending in Mexico. The result is striking, as the information gathered, clearly indicates 
that related lending in Mexico is accompanied by more favorable credit terms for the 
borrowers and worse repayment for the lending bank than non-related lending. So, 
risk is not priced appropriately and relations are misused. The Thai case is very dif-
ferent from the Mexican experience.
We discover stable determinants of lending decisions which add new insights to
the existing literature from industrialized countries. For the developing economy, as 
expected from theoretical considerations, relationship indicators have relatively 
greater importance in explaining the interest rate spread than direct risk variables. 
Furthermore credit availability is reduced for more risky borrowers, whereas direct 
risk proxies do not seem to influence spread. When using the later default of a loan 
1
 See e.g. La Porta et al., 1998, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999, Sarno and Taylor, 
1999, Dooley, 2000, Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000, Goh and Groenewold, 2000, Fac-
cio, Lang and Young, 2001, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huiz-
inga, 2004, Agbola and Kunanopparat, 2005.
2
 See surveys by Levine, 1997, World Bank, 2001; on the role of banks e.g. Beck, Levine 
and Loayza, 2000, on the impact of liberalization e.g. Arestis et al., 2002.
3
 Another 20% of assets are represented by so-called finance companies, and the remaining 
20% are held by specialized state banks and foreign banks.
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as the dependent variable, relation proxies indicate a positive effect for Thai com-
mercial banks, as close customers did not generally receive too risky credit. There is 
some evidence, however, that large (and tentatively related) customers did. More-
over, risk proxies help to explain default and thus have obviously not been fully ex-
ploited beforehand, indicating limited efficiency in Thai commercial banks’ lending 
practice.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a detailed de-
scription and analysis of the data used. The systematic examination on the ex ante 
nature of lending in Thailand is presented in Section 3. The information from the ex 
post available default variable is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a 
view on possible objections to the results of this research.
2 The data
2.1 Data compilation
The greatest hurdle in conducting this study was to gain the cooperation of Thai 
banks in allowing researchers to study their credit files. It seems to be obvious that 
these banks had no direct interest in such work and that – due to the history of the 
banking system – they feared outcomes that could attach blame to them. In getting 
the support of banks, three factors were helpful: first, the passing of time helped to 
heal wounds as many responsible persons changed positions, and procedures were 
upgraded so that if the outcome might blame anything, it would just be "history". 
Second, all participants were promised strict confidentiality so that nobody could 
identify unprofessional practices and no bank or person can be singled out. Third, 
the study is a pure research project which is not intended to gain any private informa-
tion advantage but aims to improve knowledge. It thus produces a public benefit 
which was honored by a supporting letter from the Thai Ministry of Finance, which is 
involved in banking supervision.
Starting in August 2000 we approached all 15 Thai commercial banks that ex-
isted before the crisis or their successors in case of mergers. Nine banks finally 
agreed to cooperate and are thus included in our sample. As their number is so lim-
ited and we promised confidentiality, we cannot say much about their participation 
except that it is quite representative for the size and structure of the banking sector.
Regarding the selection of credit files, there is the problem of an uncontrollable 
selection bias which could distort our sample and produce misleading results. In par-
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ticular it is to be expected that banks want to present themselves in a favorable light, 
although the personal incentive was probably low due to changing responsibilities 
and confidentiality should reduce the incentive for strategic file selection. So we tried 
to get cooperation from as many banks as possible to minimize the impact from dis-
torted selection in a certain bank. Within the banks, we asked for a randomized sam-
ple. As the depository of files often follows some criteria, in these cases we decided 
on a diversified selection. In some cases the banks presented lists of customers re-
vealing size and industry, so we could choose the files (preferring the critical indus-
tries construction and real estate).
Between September 2000 and March 2001, the nine participating banks were 
each visited for about two to three weeks. Between 35 and 85 credit files of the pre-
determined five-year period from 1992 to 1996 were analyzed in each bank. In all 
560 cases, we focus only on a single loan grant. For each loan, we personally ex-
tracted the information from the credit file or supervised the bank employee doing so 
to ensure that the information was compiled in a comparable way.
2.2 Data representativeness
Do the data in our study represent the loans made by Thai commercial banks in 
a reasonable manner? There are basically three ways to find out whether the credit 
files compiled largely represent the total population. First, the average firm size may 
be analyzed, second the industry structure of loans can be compared with the mar-
ket, and third, the share of non-performing loans (NPLs) can be compared with that 
for all commercial banks (see Menkhoff and Suwanaporn, 2003, for more details).
The minimum firm asset size realized in the sample of about one million Baht 
equals roughly 40,000 USD at the historical exchange rate. The maximum size of 
about 90 billion Baht equates to around 3.6 billion USD. This indicates what the me-
dian value of 10 million USD confirms: the sample does not represent the total econ-
omy, but rather the medium and larger sized segments of Thailand's economy. The 
reason is that the credit files stem from the headquarter offices, which handle all lar-
ger loan cases, whereas the really small loans may be decided at the branches. So 
whatever this study reveals, there is still the possibility that results may differ for 
really small-scale loans.
The industry structure of loans in the sample also shows some deviation from 
the total population as it is classified by the central bank (see Table 1). The by far 
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largest recipient of loans in the country, manufacturing industry, is also the largest in 
our sample with a 44% share. The sample, moreover, consciously over-represents 
"real estate" and "construction", which are regarded as industries deeply involved in 
the crisis, and necessarily under-represents all other industries with the exception of 
services. Those two industries with the smallest median loan size – i.e. personal 
consumption and wholesale/retail trade – are clearly underrepresented in our data, 
probably reflecting the sample's focus on medium and large size firms.
Finally, non-performing loans have a share of 45.9% in the sample. This is in 
the same dimension as published figures, which at the height of the crisis mentioned 
a figure of slightly more than 50%. Although there are large differences between the 
NPL shares of the nine banks, the overall figure signals useful information.
Overall, the data received represent only firms with bank loans and they are not 
strictly representative of commercial banks. Loans refer to medium and large size 
firms, industries are over- or under-represented to a certain degree and the NPL 
share may be slightly too low. However, bearing this in mind, the data are not mis-
leading and thus appear to be useful for our research.
2.3 Description of variables
Due to the purpose of the study, there are two dependent variables, the interest 
rate spread (IRS) and credit availability. The IRS is measured as the difference be-
tween the interest rate charged and the minimum overdraft rate. The latter is the ref-
erence rate charged to first class customers for overdraft credit and lines of credit. 
Credit availability is more difficult to grasp. Petersen and Rajan (1994, p.18) advise 
against taking the actual debt ratio as this may be an ambivalent figure, either reflect-
ing credit demand – which is not of interest here (good firms may not need credit) –
or credit supply as seen from the bank's point of view (the bank possibly rations a 
firm). We therefore rely on the "bank credit ratio" (BCR) which is the line of credit 
(L/C) divided by the sum of L/C plus liabilities. Its central advantage is that the L/C 
includes available future credit because the L/C is usually not fully used. The larger 
the BCR the greater the probability of there being unused L/C, indicating good credit 
availability. This is, of course, still a crude measure of credit availability, as there is 
no information about the extent to which the L/C has already been used. Moreover, 
the L/C is also influenced by credit demand and supply factors similar to the actual 
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credit used. The advantage of using the BCR against the debt ratio, however, is the 
– admittedly imprecise – indication about available credit in the future.
Regarding the independent variables, Table 2 presents the full list and an exact 
description of variables used. The next group after the dependent variables in the list 
is three variables that aim to directly capture the riskiness of loans. Higher risk is ex-
pected to be indicated by a higher liability-to-asset ratio (or leverage), by a lower cur-
rent ratio and a lower interest coverage ratio. The following group of variables in Ta-
ble 2 covers relationship variables. A close relation is expected to be revealed by a 
positive house bank status, a long relation duration and a small number of competing 
banks.
Accordingly, control variables are introduced. Some frequently used variables 
are classified as "indirect risk variables", as large assets, old age and high collateral 
can be regarded as risk reducing. Moreover, there are three kinds of dummies, rep-
resenting idiosyncratic influences from individual bank policies, years and industry 
influences. Finally, in Section 4 of the study, two more variables are used: L/C vol-
ume, informing about the volume of all lines of credit by the respective bank to a firm, 
and default, informing about a non-performing status of the loan in the period be-
tween credit granting and data compilation according to the latest regulations.
The descriptive statistics of these variables reveal that in particular the risk 
proxies can behave in an extreme manner. Regarding the liability-to-asset ratio, 
there are firms where liabilities are larger than assets. The current ratio can lie be-
tween 0, i.e. for firms with no liquid assets, and 139, i.e. for firms with hardly any 
short-term liabilities. Finally, the interest coverage ratio takes values between –37, 
i.e. where earnings or possibly interest expenses are negative, and 97, i.e. where 
interest expenses are extremely low. Note, moreover, that this last risk proxy is avail-
able only for less than 90% of all cases, indicating that this kind of calculation is not 
always applied, e.g. because it may be hypothetical in the case of a new firm. These 
sometimes extreme values of risk proxies justify treating them – in line with the litera-
ture – as outliers.
Finally, and consistent with other studies, the variable asset size is right-skewed 
distributed with extremely few large firms and has thus been transformed into loga-
rithmic values. The same transformation was chosen for the variable number of 
banks and L/C volume as these variables also increase very strongly for the few 
large firms.
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2.4 Characteristics of borrowing firms and loans
The last part in this Section 2 gives average values of variables and their devia-
tion by way of the relation of these variables with the asset size of borrowing firms 
(see also Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Firm-related variables are shown in Table 3. 
The smallest 10% of firms covered has assets below 22.1 million Baht, i.e. slightly 
less than 1 million USD. The largest firms have assets of more than 2,947 million 
Baht, i.e. roughly 118 million USD.
Means of the variables develop with percentiles of increasing asset size. Size 
related figures, such as age, equity and liabilities clearly go upwards. The behavior of 
the three risk proxies may therefore be more interesting: the liability-to-asset ratio 
increases slightly, the current ratio shows a hump-shaped pattern, whereas the inter-
est coverage ratio clearly goes down, with the exception of the smallest firms. This 
means that larger firms tend to be identified as unanimously more risky than medium 
sized firms and also as somewhat more risky than small firms.
The characteristics of loans depending on the asset size of borrowing firms is 
presented in Table 4. Absolute volume of lines of credit (L/C) goes up with asset 
size, as well as the default share. By contrast, interest rate spread declines, as well 
as the bank credit ratio (BCR) and collateral with increasing firm size. Regarding the 
three indicators for relationship lending, banks have fewer house bank relations with 
larger firms, relation duration goes up with size and larger firms have more lending 
banks.
In summary, Tables 3 and 4 provide evidence that the data set includes eco-
nomically rational information and that this structure is similar to well-known struc-
tures from mature markets. Empirical examinations first analyze bank lending behav-
ior using ex ante information (Section 3), and then using ex post information in addi-
tion (Section 4).
3 Bank lending analyzed by use of ex ante information
We find that lending of Thai commercial banks was by and large functional. The 
benchmark for this assessment is earlier results on lending determinants of banks 
from industrialized countries. The comparison with these mature markets shows, 
moreover, that the importance of lending determinants differs in the emerging Thai 
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10
market, reflecting institutional differences. In particular, relationship banking is pro-
nounced.
We analyze lending behavior by applying the standard empirical technique of 
the relationship banking literature. According to this procedure, the price and the 
availability of loans are explained by a set of theoretically reasonable variables. The 
data used for these regressions stems from the information that was available to the 
bank at the point of decision making. In our case, this is the information contained in 
the credit files.
3.1 The pricing of loans
The pricing of loans extended by Thai commercial banks does not really sup-
port the verdict of bad banking. The extensive research on lending decisions in ma-
ture markets found that risk factors play a surprisingly small role, that relationship 
sometimes matters and that the size of a firm is always important.4 In the case of an 
emerging market, such as Thailand, we expect that the credit granting technology is 
less developed and information from balance sheet data is more opaque so that risk 
factors are unimportant for loan pricing. In the case of a bad banking environment, 
one may even expect that lending decisions become largely independent of eco-
nomic determinants. However, our evidence is different.
Moreover, the institutional environment of an emerging economy seems favor-
able to the widespread use of relationship lending. Relationship building between 
lender and borrower can be understood as an institution to partially overcome the 
incomplete and asymmetric information between the parties involved. The more per-
fect markets are and the better the quality of information is, the more contracts are 
expected to be reliable and enforceable and the smaller is any possible advantage 
from relationship lending. We can thus expect that Thailand is a case where relation-
ship lending may play a prominent role, in particular for smaller firms.
What is less clear is whether relationship lending will make loan prices cheaper 
or more expensive. Arguing that a close bank has intimate private knowledge of the 
borrowing firm and can thus assess risks more precisely would justify the realization 
of lower interest rates. One can, however, also argue that the close bank is in a 
4
 In addition to studies mentioned on the US see e.g. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) on 
Belgium, Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) and Elsas (2005) on 
Germany and Ferri and Messori (2000) on Italy.
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strong bargaining position as it is the main provider of credit and as its potential with-
drawal of credit would provide a strong negative signal to other lenders. In this 
sense, a firm is to some degree "caught" in the particular relation with a close bank. 
In the situation of an emerging economy both arguments seem to be of particular 
relevance: information asymmetry is very important and would lead to a negative cor-
relation between interest rate spread and the incidence of relationship lending. How-
ever, competition between banks is also rather lower than in mature markets and 
would thus allow a close bank to more easily exploit its position. This would lead to a 
positive correlation between spread and relationship lending. In summary, higher 
interest rates for "related" loans indicate low competition in the market. Lower 
spreads, however, can be problematic too: they indicate bad banking if risk-taking is 
inappropriate.
To empirically examine the Thai case, we estimate – in accordance with the lit-
erature – OLS regressions where variables are included which have been previously 
identified as important in such examinations. To consider conflicting aspects, several 
specifications of the following general form are used:
Interest rate spread = 0 + 1 risk proxies + 2 relationship indicators
+ 3 indirect risk variables + 4 bank dummies 
+ 5 year dummies + 6 industry dummies + 
Specification (1) in Table 5 proceeds as suggested by Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) and serves as the benchmark. In order to avoid possibly distorting influences 
from extreme values of the risk variables (see Section 2.3), Petersen and Rajan sug-
gest setting a negative value of the interest rate coverage ratio to zero as well as ex-
cluding the most extreme 5% of cases from the three risk variables. The disadvan-
tage of this procedure is that the case number goes down to 416.
In this benchmark specification, the signs of almost all variables are as ex-
pected from theory. Neglecting the constant term, it is unfortunately the first risk
proxy – the liability-to-asset ratio – which presents an unexpected negative sign, in-
dicating that firms with higher leverage would receive cheaper money.5 The other two 
risk proxies have the expected negative sign. Turning to the group of relationship 
variables, these show negative signs too, indicating that related loans are cheaper 
(see e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995). The lower spread resulting from more lending 
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banks indicates competition in the industry. The sign of the asset size variable is as 
theoretically expected. Collateral has a positive sign, indicating that collateral could 
only partially cover the high risk, collateralized loans being still riskier than others
(see detailed in Menkhoff, Neuberger and Suwanaporn, 2005). Finally, the age vari-
able is expected to show a negative sign, but obviously the effect is already included 
in other correlated variables, such as size, and the remaining effect is close to zero.
The behavior of the dummies – not shown here – is as follows: the large and 
different coefficients for the nine banks are remarkable, indicating either quite differ-
ent borrowers or strategies. The year dummies have low coefficients, indicating 
slightly growing spreads over time. This time trend may be caused by two effects: 
first, the economic conditions have become rather worse over time and second, 
some disintermediation has happened (see Menkhoff, 2000) which may not be fully 
captured by the other variables. Finally, the coefficients of the industry dummies are 
of small size and often point to the expected direction, such as higher spreads for 
construction and real estate and lower spreads for (the preferred industry of) agricul-
ture or banks. Overall, the signs of the coefficients are rational.
Turning to the explanatory strength of the variables, three coefficients are sta-
tistically significant, apart from the constant term and bank dummies. First of all, the 
asset size variable is dominant. The risk proxies are not statistically significant in 
contrast to the relationship indicators. Among the latter, even two of them are signifi-
cant, i.e. the house bank variable as well as the number of banks lending to the firm.6
This indicates the importance of relationship lending, a finding that is robust through-
out further analyses. The relationship determinants were insignificant for loan pricing 
in the USA (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) or in Germany (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998).7
In summary, loan pricing determinants of Thai commercial banks are similar in 
structure but different in importance to those in industrialized countries. The signifi-
cant determinants include an indirect risk variable and important relationship factors. 
There is some evidence of functional competition in the lending market. All these 
findings on loan pricing do not signal the existence of bad banking.
5
 No significant effects of leverage have been found among others by Berger and Udell, 
1995, or Petersen and Rajan, 1994, the latter also with a negative sign in two specifications.
6
 We confirm the finding of Elsas (2005) that a house bank variable probably better captures 
relationship lending than a duration variable.
7
 Another significant variable – not shown here – is for the construction industry, which 
makes sense for this highly cyclical and leveraged business.
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In order to check the robustness of findings we examine several modifications. 
Specification (2) aims at better capturing the non-linear firm size effect. Taking ac-
count of the increasing interest rate spread for the ten per cent largest firms (see Ta-
ble 4), we add a second size term to the benchmark specification which effectively 
models this non-linearity. The result is, indeed, an improvement towards theoretical 
expectations as the overall fit becomes better, the collateral coefficient becomes sig-
nificant and the "wrong" sign of the liability-to-asset ratio is now of negligible size. In 
another examination we follow Berger and Udell (1995) and split the total sample at 
the median firm size of about 300 million Baht (i.e. 12 million USD at historical rate) 
into two subsamples of small and large firms. It is expected that the small firm sam-
ple has a higher influence of relationship variables. Specification (3) shows respec-
tive findings for the smaller firms, which has the expected higher overall fit than the 
regression of larger firms (specification 4). Coefficients do not change in comparison 
with the benchmark – except for the liability-to-asset ratio becoming positive – but 
significance of coefficients goes down, probably due to the smaller sample size. 
Again, these results underline the existence of principally reasonable lending prac-
tices. By contrast, in the large firm specification (4) neither asset size nor house bank 
status explain anything. Only the variable relation duration is statistically significant 
and the number of banks becomes significant at a 11% level. This suggests in com-
bination with the comparatively low explained variance two lessons: relationship is 
always important in Thailand but can change its expression and further influences 
may be important in the loan market for large firms which are not so well covered 
here.
In a related exercise, specification (5) picks up the influence from house banks 
on the liability-to-asset ratio by integrating both variables into a new interactive vari-
able. It is found that the unexpected sign of this risk proxy is generated by house 
banks only, whereas non-house banks set higher loan rates to firms with higher lev-
erage. This result may be interpreted as imprudent lending by house banks or as the 
outcome of the house banks' function, such as to finance younger firms or to allow 
firms' operations with higher leverage. The role of house banks will be examined in 
more detail later.8
8
 To check whether results depend on the sample size, various specifications – e.g. with less 
restrictions on the risk variables – have been run without major changes (see Menkhoff and 
Suwanaporn, 2003).
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Having addressed pricing, we now turn to the question of availability of loans.
3.2 The availability of loans
Thai commercial banks use credit availability as a means of controlling the risk 
of their loan portfolio. This reveals even more clearly than for the pricing regression 
that risk matters in lending decisions and it confirms the above finding that emerging 
markets operate differently from mature markets.
The theory of credit rationing links rationing to informational asymmetry in credit 
markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As asymmetric information between lender and 
borrower is even more pronounced in emerging markets, one may expect reduced 
possibilities for discriminative pricing by Thai commercial banks. Instead, banks may 
then rely more on rationing, i.e. influencing credit availability according to the per-
ceived riskiness of borrowers. Studies from mature markets indicate another conse-
quence of relationship banking: a good relation improves credit availability.
The empirical examination of the Thai case uses the same set of explanatory 
variables as above. They are regressed on the "bank credit ratio"-variable which 
aims to capture credit availability. The outcome presented as specification (1) in Ta-
ble 6 shows, indeed, a reassuring finding: as can be expected from theoretical rea-
soning, the sign of coefficients is mostly opposite to the pricing regressions – mean-
ing that banks react to the same set of variables with higher spreads and/or relatively 
lower amount of loans. In addition, two of the three risk proxies show the expected 
sign and the liability-to-asset ratio is now even statistically significant and of high 
economic importance. This result – in combination with the earlier findings on loan 
pricing – suggests that Thai commercial banks address risk more by limiting the 
amount of credit than by increasing the price of loans. Regarding the concern of bad 
banking, loan markets seem to be functioning in the sense that risk is considered by 
setting prices and even stronger by controlling loan volumes.
Further results seem noteworthy: a house bank relation improves credit avail-
ability, as identified by earlier literature on mature markets (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 
1994, Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001). The asset size variable does not seem to 
capture the riskiness of a firm but rather reveals a limitation of our credit availability 
indicator as large firms rely much less on bank credit and thus also need less open 
credit lines (see also Table 4). Moreover, the differences between the nine banks are 
much smaller regarding the provision of credit availability than regarding their loan 
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pricing (not reported). This may be interpreted as a further indication that the sys-
tematic component of lending behavior of Thai commercial banks can be better un-
derstood by looking at the relative volume of loans rather than at prices.
Further regressions indicate the importance of credit availability for the lending 
decisions of Thai commercial banks. Splitting the sample into loans to small and 
large firms does not influence the outcome much, and particularly not so drastically 
as it did for interest rate spreads. The only new significant result for small firms is the 
detrimental influence from many lending banks, possibly signaling some problems in 
attracting large amounts when there are "too many" banks necessary (see specifica-
tion 2). Regarding large firms, another variable becomes significant, i.e. the positive 
influence of relation duration (see specification 3), a result already known from the 
pricing regression. This may indicate that a longer lending relationship increases 
credit availability because the bank learns more about the borrower. The variable 
age, however, shows a statistically negative sign, which we interpret as indication of 
other financing alternatives of established large firms. Finally, specification (4) in-
forms about determinants of house bank relations only. Sign, size and significance of 
coefficients are very similar to earlier findings, indicating that house banks also con-
duct risk control via credit availability.
Summarizing Section 3, we find that risk is priced. Risk is controlled even more 
rigorously by adapting credit volume. Relationship variables are very important, as 
close relations go along with better prices and better credit availability. Moreover, 
relationship lending and credit rationing seem to be fruitful concepts in understanding 
bank lending in emerging markets. The next Section 4 will put the rationale of Thai 
banks' lending under an ambitious test: how did banks perform from an ex post per-
spective?
4 Bank lending analyzed by use of ex post information
The tough test of an ex post analysis, which goes beyond most literature in this 
field, reveals some weaknesses in Thai banks' lending policy but does not confirm 
the bad banking hypothesis. We distinguish in our analysis between the motivation 
towards bad banking, signaled by a misuse of relation, and the practice of bad bank-
ing, signaled by underutilization of information on riskiness.
As new ex post information we introduce the default variable. Default happens 
in our data if the loan has turned into a non-performing loan between loan granting in 
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1992-96 and data compilation in 2000/01. This means for our sample that in most 
cases the Asian crisis caused default. Accepting that this crisis was difficult to fore-
cast, the incidence of default is largely influenced by a macro shock and may be thus 
a noisy indicator for imprudent lending behavior (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1997).
Nevertheless, even a simple correlation analysis of default with lending deter-
minants shows that available credit file information indicated vulnerability of firms. 
Analysis (1) in Table 7 shows that two out of three risk variables are significantly re-
lated to default and that all of them have the expected sign. This is remarkable as it 
reveals the potential usefulness of risk proxies to forecast later default. Moreover, 
size predicts – contrary to conventional wisdom – later default as well as a younger 
age of firms. Finally, the signs of relationship variables indicate that related firms had 
a lower probability of default, although only a longer relation duration indicates this 
significantly. So simple correlations help to understand the relation of non-performing 
with high risk and the presence of relationship lending: it is clearly risk that matters. 
We interpret this as evidence against the bad banking hypothesis that too close rela-
tions would hinder prudent lending. It is less clear whether risk should have been 
anticipated better. We analyze these issues in a multivariate setting by regressing 
lending determinants on default.
Due to the 1-0-nature of the default variable, probit regressions are used here. 
The respective benchmark regression is shown as specification (2) in Table 7. Two 
of the three risk proxies have the expected sign, the current ratio is statistically highly 
significant and the interest coverage ratio is almost significant (at 11%). The case of 
relationship proxies is somewhat different as none of them are statistically significant. 
In particular, house bank relations, as well as a smaller number of lending banks, 
tend to be related with lower rather than higher default probability. In this specifica-
tion, younger firms and – surprisingly again – larger assets are positively related with 
default. This result confirms the correlation analysis (see analysis 1 in Table 7).
It raises the question as to which influences may be hidden in the unexpectedly 
signed asset variable. Splitting the sample into small and large firms shows no con-
tradiction between both regressions – presented as specifications (3) and (4) respec-
tively – but different importance in determinants. The asset factor is a particular prob-
lem of large firms. As it is only for house banks where firm size becomes significant 
(not reported), this indicates that there might be influences on credit granting beyond 
economic rationale for the group of large and close firms in the sense of La Porta, 
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López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (2003). Another finding seems noteworthy, i.e. the 
opposite signs for the liability-to-asset ratio. The theoretically unexpected negative 
sign in specification (2) is obviously driven by small firm financing where it may rep-
resent rather a positive signal from already existing external financial sources.
In another effort to better understand the influence of the asset variable, speci-
fication (5) distinguishes the effect of higher credit volume from asset size. Both vari-
ables are highly correlated and therefore neglected in other regressions, but their 
joint inclusion could be informative here. The credit volume variable has a positive 
and highly significant coefficient, whereas the asset variable loses significance. 
Three more changes towards significance can be recognized when compared with 
specification (2): in the house bank variable, the interest coverage ratio and the liabil-
ity-to-asset ratio (this latter variable for small firms only, see above). How to interpret 
these results?
First, specification (5) confirms earlier evidence that relationship banking does 
not "generate" default. By contrast, house banks are related to non-default which 
may be caused by better understanding of the firm and/or by better credit availability 
for the firm. Second, several direct and indirect risk proxies (current ratio, interest 
coverage ratio and age) seem to be useful in capturing riskiness. As they have not 
been used ex ante to full extent, banks may want to improve risk consideration in the 
future.9 Third, a high credit volume is rather more important than being a large firm 
for subsequent default. This result may indicate imprudent aggressive lending poli-
cies, in particular regarding large firms. However, it is also consistent with the argu-
ment that the credit crunch in Thailand's early post-crisis years hit credit-dependent 
firms hardest (see Agénor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister, 2004). The financial structure 
of firms is then the reason for default, in particular when the economic crisis is com-
plemented by a banking crisis.
In summary, the analysis of the default variable helps to discriminate between 
the motivation and practice of bad banking: close relations to borrowers do not seem 
to be the core issue in explaining default with the exception of some easy lending to 
large, close customers. The major problem in bank lending was rather some under-
utilization of information on the riskiness of borrowers.
9
 Additional analyses on this issue are performed in Menkhoff and Suwanaporn (2003).
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5 Concluding comments
This research directly analyzes the behavior of local banks in an emerging mar-
ket from several hundred credit files of Thai commercial banks. The findings show 
that the available risk variables are not important in pricing loans, a result that is simi-
lar to that found in mature markets. New is, however, the high weight of relationship 
in decision making – when compared to mature markets – which is theoretically ex-
pected. Also, the importance of credit availability as a preferred instrument for con-
trolling risk is sensible in more opaque financial markets. However, Thai commercial 
banks did not operate without problems. The analysis of ex post default cases shows 
that there is an element of too generous credit granting to related large firms. More-
over and quite generally, available risk information could have been used better to 
restrict default. Both elements of negative related lending as well as underutilization 
of information may not be unexpected for an emerging market. Given the verdict of 
bad banking, however, the unimportant or – depending on the specification – stabiliz-
ing role of relationship in default regressions is more surprising. Therefore, Thai com-
mercial banks' lending rationale provides a rather "good" example of relationship 
lending, in contrast to the Mexican case. Thai banks' main shortcoming is quite con-
ventional, as they fail to fully recognize risk factors. This failure indicates that banks 
could improve operations but it does not indicate outright bad banking.
Several general lessons seem to emerge for the understanding of bank lending 
in developing countries, although more work appears to be warranted: first, emerging 
countries can be, but do not have to be, characteriz d by largely functional lending 
markets. The lesson from Thai commercial banks is that – despite the heavy finan-
cial crisis in 1997 – risk was considered and relations were not generally misused in 
lending decisions before the crisis (see also Levy-Yayati et al., 2004). Second, the 
tentatively higher degree of asymmetric information in emerging economies explains 
the way bank lending works: our case study shows that relationship lending and 
credit rationing play a larger role than in mature markets (see also Demetriades and 
Luintel, 2001). Third, the functioning of a developing banking market can be clearly 
improved (see e.g. Hahm, 2004). Even the notoriously unreliable balance sheets in 
Thailand provided useful information on later default, information that was not fully 
used by domestic banks. It is thus most important to upgrade financial technology in 
accordance with the institutional possibilities (World Bank, 2001, Assane and 
Grammy, 2003).
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Table 1. Distribution of Loans by Industry
1 in million Baht
2 Dark shading indicates an overrepresentation in comparison with the "sample" or "all com-
mercial banks" by at least 5 percentage points.
3 Source: Bank of Thailand
Asset size of sample firms1Industry Num-
ber of 
sample 
loans
Loan 
size, 
me-
dian1
Share of loan 
volume by in-
dustry (in %)2
Min. Mean Me-
dian
Max. Sam-
ple
All 
comm. 
Banks3
Agriculture 15 102 743 770 1831 100 2.0 4.6
Mining 2 1000 1150 1150 1300 150 0.2 0.6
Manufacturing 213 3 2622 303 90582 56 44.0 25.0
Construction 71 2 2721 272 58440 53 11.1 4.2
Wholesale/  
Retail trade
90 2 1104 143 35300 30 5.5 17.7
Import 28 15 751 146 10596 55 1.8 3.4
Export 19 5 668 300 4239 62 2.0 4.7
Banking and 
finance
13 32 539 395 1825 100 2.3 6.9
Real estate 47 1 1856 192 18984 70 15.3 10.3
Public utilities 5 54 2028 417 7539 160 0.9 2.4
Service 52 3 3967 528 60023 108 12.8 7.7
Personal 
consumption
5 3 750 5 3650 3 2.2 12.5
Overall 560 1 2165 246 90582 56 100 100
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Table 2 Variable Description
Variable Name Description
Dependent variables
Interest rate spread (IRS) Interest rate spread over minimum overdraft rate (MOR)
Bank credit ratio (BCR) Volume of the line of credit (L/C) granted in relation to the sum 
of liabilities plus L/C
Direct risk variables
Liability-to-asset ratio The book value of liabilities divided by assets in the same year
Current ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities in the same year
Interest coverage ratio Earnings before interest expense, tax, depreciation and amorti-
zation divided by interest expense
Relationship variables
House bank status The code is 1 if bank considers itself as a house bank of the 
borrower and 0 if otherwise
Relation duration The number of years of an active bank-borrower relationship 
prior to the credit decision, normally the period since first credit 
granting
Number of banks that 
lend to the borrower
The number of banks that the borrower has relationship with (as 
stated in the credit files)
Indirect risk variables
Assets The latest book value of assets of the firm prior to the credit 
decision
Age Number of years that the borrower has been in operation prior 
to the credit decision
Collateral Collateral value given by the firm as percentage of the line of 
credit granted (degree of collateralization, not its incidence)
Dummy variables
Bank Dummy variables for the nine lending banks covered
Year Dummy variable for the years 1992 to 1996
Industry Set of 12 dummy variables indicating the industry
L/C volume Total volume of lines of credit granted by the respective bank, 
generally representing short-term loans
Default Loan became non-performing between granting and data com-
pilation
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Table 3 Characteristics of Borrowing Firms by Firm Asset Size
Characteristics Asset percentiles Mean
0-10 10-25 25-50 50-75 75-90 90-100
Book value of 
assets1
< 
22.1
22.1-
76.0
76.0-
246.1
246.1-
1,000
1,000-
2,947
> 
2,947
2,165
Age (in years) 7.78 13.30 12.78 17.92 18.61 17.20 14.65
Equity1 2.69 11.39 34.04 124.11 418.42 3,439 463.87
Liabilities1 5.80 36.11 106.92 389.28 1,263 13,917 1,702
Liability-to-asset 
ratio
0.61 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.74
Current ratio 1.57 3.77 4.64 3.12 1.02 0.93 3.18
Interest coverage 
ratio
3.70 4.91 3.00 2.93 3.15 2.30 3.17
1
 Figures are in million Baht.
Table 4 Characteristics of Loans by Firm Asset Size
Characteristics Asset percentiles Mean
0-10 10-25 25-50 50-75 75-90 90-100
L/C volume (in 
million Baht)
14.33 39.73 83.97 188.81 492.51 840.30 240.58
Interest rate 
spread
2.53 1.23 0.74 0.34 0.17 0.26 0.76
BCR 0.60 0.45 0.38 0.29 0.23 0.10 0.34
Default in %1 16.34 10.92 25.50 22.19 64.88 50.01 45.90
Collateral in % 78.95 63.40 62.62 44.15 32.77 34.06 52.95
House bank 
status in %
76 51 56 47 34 28 49
Relation duration 
(in years)
5.51 7.06 7.36 8.86 8.93 9.26 7.96
Number of lend-
ing banks 1.76 2.50 3.51 5.04 5.78 8.53 4.36
1
 Weighted by volume
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 Table 5 Risk and Relationship Factors in the Pricing of Loans
Dependent variable: Interest rate spread
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Liability-to-asset ratio
-0.231 
(0.186)
-0.008
(0.176)
0.067  
(0.290)
0.272
(0.181)
Current ratio -0.065(0.042)
-0.031
(0.036)
-0.043
(0.056)
0.016
(0.045)
-0.060
(0.040)
Interest coverage ratio -0.015(0.015)
-0.011
(0.014)
-0.008
(0.028)
-0.007
(0.013)
-0.014
(0.015)
House bank status * (-1) 
Liability to asset ratio
0.360***
(0.118)
House bank status
-0.220** 
(0.095)
-0.181**
(0.090)
-0.269* 
(0.142)
-0.029
(0.117)
Relation duration -0.009(0.007)
-0.011
(0.007)
-0.006
(0.013)
-0.012*
(0.007)
-0.009
(0.007)
Ln (Number of banks) -0.141**(0.060)
-0.144***
(0.056)
-0.108
(0.111)
-0.106
(0.064)
-0.145**
(0.061)
Ln (assets) -0.236*** (0.034)
-0.856***
(0.087)
-0.483*** 
(0.064)
-0.037
(0.043)
-0.235*** 
(0.033)
Ln (assets) * Ln (assets) 0.053***(0.007)
Age 0.001(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
0.004
(0.009)
0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.004)
Collateral 0.002(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
(Constant) 3.143*** (0.307)
4.387***
(0.301)
4.159*** 
(0.370)
0.341
(0.484)
2.970*** 
(0.268)
Bank dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Number of cases 416 416 208 208 416
Adjusted R2 0.456 0.527 0.505 0.123 0.461
F-statistic 11.891 15.010 7.825 1.910*** 12.471
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level (**: 5 percent level, *: 10 per-
cent)
The table presents OLS regressions with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Nega-
tive values of the interest coverage ratio are set to zero and the most extreme 5% cases of each risk 
proxy are excluded. In specification (2) the variable Ln (assets) * Ln (assets) is added. Specification (3) 
refers to small firms only, specification (4) to large firms respectively and in specification (5) house 
bank status is interactively linked to the liability-to-asset ratio.
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 Table 6 Risk and Relationship Factors for the Availability of Loans
Dependent variable: Bank credit ratio (BCR)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Liability-to-asset ratio -0.330*** 
(0.052)
-0.350*** 
(0.061)
-0.365*** 
(0.090)
-0.351*** 
(0.072)
Current ratio -0.003
(0.011)
0.001
(0.012)
-0.014
(0.024)
0.009
(0.012)
Interest coverage ratio -0.004
(0.005)
0.005
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.007)
0.002
(0.009)
House bank status 0.096*** 
(0.023)
0.089*** 
(0.031)
0.089*** 
(0.036)
Relation duration 0.003
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.007***
(0.003)
Ln (Number of banks) -0.000
(0.017)
-0.041**
(0.026)
0.010
(0.023)
-0.001
(0.023)
Ln (assets) -0.057*** 
(0.006)
-0.052*** 
(0.013)
-0.067*** 
(0.011)
-0.052*** 
(0.009)
Age -0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.003** 
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.001)
Collateral 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
(Constant) 0.850*** 
(0.072)
0.787*** 
(0.089)
1.037*** 
(0.138)
0.975*** 
(0.097)
Bank dummies yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of cases 416 208 208 201
Adjusted R2 0.454 0.445 0.371 0.355
F-statistic 11.775 6.354 4.816 4.675
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level (**: 5 percent level, *:10 per-
cent)
The table presents OLS regressions with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Nega-
tive values of the interest coverage ratio are set to zero and the most extreme 5% cases of each risk 
proxy are excluded. Specification (2) presents small firms and specification (3) large firms. In specifica-
tion (4) only house bank cases are included.
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Table 7 Risk and Relationship Factors in Explaining Default
Correlations 
with default
Dependent variable: Default
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Liability-to-asset ratio 0.025 -0.577
(0.432)
-2.958***
(0.804)
0.755
(0.642)
-0.783*
(0.432)
Current ratio -0.150*** -0.328**
(0.132)
-0.550**
(0.251)
-0.165
(0.165)
-0.336**
(0.131)
Interest coverage ratio -0.109** -0.082
(0.051)
-0.400***
(0.152)
-0.071
(0.061)
-0.110**
(0.051)
House bank status -0.044 -0.266
(0.219)
-1.052***
(0.363)
-0.204
(0.323)
-0.486**
(0.230)
Relation duration -0.090* 0.009
(0.017)
-0.034
(0.052)
0.021
(0.026)
0.006
(0.018)
Ln (Number of banks) 0.066 0.052
(0.137)
0.227
(0.286)
-0.159
(0.179)
0.021
(0.142)
Ln (assets) 0.206*** 0.176***
(0.055)
0.301*
(0.181)
0.276***
(0.106)
0.016
(0.072)
Age -0.098** -0.031**
(0.012)
-0.018
(0.039)
-0.037***
(0.014)
-0.028**
(0.013)
Collateral 0.014 0.000
(0.002)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.000
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
Ln (L/C volume) 0.319***
(0.082)
(Constant) -0.522
(0.591)
-0.526
(0.978)
-1.844*
(1.119)
-0.751
(0.635)
Bank dummies yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of cases 416 208 208 416
McFadden R2 0.299 0.533 0.368 0.337
LR-statistic 109.845 77.077 78.976 123.776
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level (**: 5 percent level, *: 10 per-
cent)
The table presents Pearson rank correlations in column (1) and probit regressions with Huber/White 
robust covariances in columns (2) to (5). Negative values of the interest coverage ratio are set to zero 
and the most extreme 5% cases of each risk proxy are excluded. Specification (3) presents small firms 
and specification (4) large firms. In specification (5) the variable L/C volume ("line of credit volume") is 
added.
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